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There is growing interest in how management controls operate together as a system of interrelated 
mechanisms. Although theoretical debate dates back to the seminal paper of Otley (1980), there remains 
little empirical analysis of how control mechanisms combine as a package. To increase knowledge in this 
area this study explores how multiple accounting and other control mechanisms commonly combine and 
the associations these combinations have with firm context. From a cross-sectional sample of 400 firms, 
this study presents an empirically derived taxonomy of five configurations used by top managers, labelled 
as simple, results, action, devolved, and hybrid. Many of these patterns closely resemble conventional 
control configurations, while others represent distinctively contemporary arrangements, such as flexible 
variants of traditional bureaucracy (action), and instances where multiple and seemingly conflicting 
control modes intermesh (hybrid). In analyzing these configurations this study provides accounting and 













It has long been recognized that management controls operate as systems of interrelated mechanisms 
(Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980). This literature 
visualizes accounting not as an isolated system but as an interwoven component of an organizational 
control package (Otley, 1980). Most empirical research, however, examines accounting and other control 
mechanisms independently (Grabner and Moers, 2013; Luft and Shields, 2003; Speklé, 2001). Although 
much has been learnt about the determinants and effects of individual mechanisms, the literature provides 
little insight into the influence of any one control upon another or how multiple controls combine. As 
Abernethy and Brownell (1997, p. 246) observe: 
 
It is clear that organizations rely on combinations of control mechanisms in any given setting […] 
Until empirical work begins to examine this complex question, our understanding of how the full 
range of management controls operates will remain piecemeal. 
 
The aim of this study is to empirically examine how accounting and other control mechanisms combine 
and the associations these combinations have with contextual circumstances. Specifically, this study 
develops a taxonomy of control configurations. Although taxonomies are descriptions, rather than 
explanations, of empirical phenomena, they are important for valid theory construction for a number of 
reasons (Sanchez, 1993). First, taxonomies provide an empirical basis to refine and extend conceptual 
frameworks. Much of the theorizing in management control research is built upon ideal types – e.g., 
output, behaviour, and clan (Ouchi, 1977, 1979), mechanistic and organic (Burns and Stalker, 1961). 
Ideal types are useful conceptual devices as they parsimoniously describe discrete bundles of control and 
other structural components and the contexts in which they operate effectively. However, more complex 
arrangements are empirically observable, such as organizations that employ multiple control modes 
simultaneously (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Caglio and Ditillo, 2008; Snell, 1992). Empirically 
derived configurations can extend existing frameworks by describing more complex arrangements that 
arise in practice. 
 
Second, taxonomies are useful for establishing the boundary conditions of contingency propositions. 
Organizational literature demonstrates that the relationships between contextual and structural variables in 
one configuration may be unrelated or even inversely related in another (Meyer et al., 1993; Sanchez, 
1993). Focusing exclusively on deriving universal propositions is therefore likely to return weak or 
confounding results, as evidenced in streams of contingency research (Hartmann, 2000; Hartmann and 
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Moers, 2003; Langfield-Smith, 2007; Speklé, 2001). Identifying common control configurations can 
improve the generalizability of contingency results by locating the organizational populations in which 
particular relationships are likely to be valid (Sanchez, 1993). 
 
Third, knowledge of broad control patterns is necessary for constructing valid empirical tests of specific 
mechanisms. A good theory of accounting control should contain as few determinants as possible (Malmi 
and Granlund, 2009). But as organizations employ multiple controls that may be systematically associated 
with accounting, those mechanisms need to be controlled for in empirical research. Given that not every 
control mechanism available to an organization can be feasibly incorporated into statistical analyses one 
way of “addressing these concerns is to identify a variety of control taxonomies and consider how they 
relate to various aspects of MCS” (Chenhall, 2003, p. 131). Identifying those mechanisms that coexist in a 
particular context facilitates development of parsimonious models that are at a reduced risk of producing 
spurious results. Furthermore, mechanisms that tend to be observed in combination provide useful 
guidance for researchers seeking to identify complementarity or substitutability between control 
mechanisms (Grabner and Moers, 2013). 
 
From a cross-sectional sample of 400 medium to large firms this study constructs a taxonomy of five 
control configurations used by top managers, labelled as simple, results, action, devolved, and hybrid. 
While many of these patterns have close resemblance to prior control types (simple, results, devolved), 
others represent distinctively contemporary arrangements not widely recognized as prominent control 
forms – such as flexible variants of traditional bureaucracy (action) and instances where multiple and 
seemingly conflicting control modes intermesh (hybrid). In examining how accounting is implicated 
within these configurations, and the associations with contextual variables, this study presents a more 
complex image of how accounting and other controls commonly combine than currently recognized in the 
literature. Such an image, although by no means entirely surprising, provides accounting and control 
scholars with empirical observations to refine and extend existing frameworks and theory. 
 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section outlines the configuration approach 
and the theoretical and empirical research on organizational and control configurations, followed by the 
research questions of this study. The section thereafter introduces a framework that informs the choice of 
control mechanisms and contextual factors used in the empirical analysis. The research design and 
statistical methods are then detailed, followed by the results and analysis. The final section presents the 




2. Literature review and research questions 
 
The configuration approach contends that a comprehensive understanding of accounting and control 
structure diversity requires organizations to be investigated as multidimensional arrangements of 
interconnected components (Dess et al., 1993; Meyer et al., 1993).1 The central assumption underpinning 
this approach is that a strong propensity exists for organizational components to cluster systematically, 
forming a discrete number of temporally stable arrangements (Gersick, 1991). This tendency arises from 
both exogenous and endogenous forces. Exogenous forces, such as environmental selection and 
competition (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), effectively limit the number of viable combinations. But 
endogenous pressures mean that organizations will actively seek out arrangements that have an internally 
consistent logic (Child, 1972). This implies that organizations are not distributed widely across structural 
and contextual traits, but will tend to co-locate around a finite number of empirically identifiable patterns. 
This position is supported in a review of major taxonomic studies in organizational literature by Sanchez 
(1993), who concludes that notwithstanding a number of methodological shortcomings “in the aggregate 
they appear to demonstrate that organizations do indeed cluster in recognizable groups” (p. 73). 
 
Organizations are expected to maintain internal consistency even at the expense of superior 
environmental fit of individual components. Piecemeal alterations work against developing efficiency in 
operational routines and destroy existing complementarities between system components (Miller and 
Mintzberg, 1984). Modifying only a few components at a time may “not come at all close to achieving all 
the benefits that are available through a fully coordinated move, and may even have negative payoffs” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, p. 191). Although there is some latitude to adjust arrangements in response 
to contextual variations, particularly peripheral components that are less connected, organizations will 
actively resist changes that threaten internal consistency (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985).2 The import of 
this contention is that the design and effectiveness of a particular component, such as accounting, will be 
associated not only to external conditions, but also upon how that component is situated within the 
                                                     
1 In organization literature there are numerous terms used in relation to configurations (Dess et al., 1993; Myer et al., 
1993; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Configuration refers to a specific arrangement of multiple parts, components, 
elements, mechanisms, attributes, or the like. A classification scheme of configurations can be developed 
conceptually (typologies) or derived empirically (taxonomies). Archetypes and gestalts are often considered as 
synonymous with configurations, although the term gestalt tends to be used to indicate arrangements that commonly 
arise in reality, whereas archetypes may refer to arrangements that only exist conceptually. These arrangements may 
or may not be optimal. Theoretically consistent, optimal arrangements are referred to as ideal types. 
2 Not all components in a configuration need be tightly coupled. Peripheral components loosely connected to the 
structural core may be more readily adjustable to changes in contextual conditions, and consequently, be amenable 
to examination using conventional methods without risk of model misspecification (Chenhall, 2003). 
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broader control package. Understanding how control mechanisms combine is therefore necessary to 
adequately explain the variety of accounting structures found in practice. 
 
Current understanding of how control mechanisms combine is largely derived from organizational 
typologies. These typologies describe theoretically consistent configurations of structural components and 
contextual conditions. One of the first studies to systematically examine patterns of structure and context 
is Burns and Stalker (1961). They outline organizational types that represent effective responses to either 
high or low uncertainty. The formalized and vertical structure of the mechanistic organization is 
considered suitable to stable environmental conditions, while the informal and lateral structure of the 
organic organization is more appropriate in dynamic and uncertain settings. Perhaps the most influential 
work on organization configurations is by Mintzberg (1979, 1989). Building on the research of Burns and 
Stalker (1961) and other early investigations into structural diversity (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Pugh et al., 1969; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965), Mintzberg describes 
seven configurations: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, adhocracy, missionary structure, 
professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form, and the political organization.3 Each configuration is 
associated with particular environmental and technological conditions, and organizational factors such as 
age and size. 
 
Although presenting rich descriptions, as the typologies of Burns and Stalker and Mintzberg originate 
from literatures outside accounting they contain limited detail on how and why the design and use of 
accounting mechanisms vary across configurations. There are, however, a number of typologies that 
address more specifically control structures. Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) and Merchant (1981) describe 
two control approaches, administrative and interpersonal, with particular emphasis on budgetary control. 
The choice of approach is explained in terms of organizational size, diversity, and technological 
complexity, with larger, more diverse, and technological complex firms requiring an administrative 
control approach. Ouchi (1977, 1979) identifies three control strategies – output, behaviour, and clan (see 
also Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992). The preference for either output or behaviour control is a function of 
information characteristics. If the firm has knowledge of the transformation process then tasks can be 
programmed and control accomplished through evaluation of behaviours. When the firm has valid and 
reliable measures of goals then control is attained by evaluating outputs. If neither antecedent is satisfied 
then the firm will rely on clan control, developed through input mechanisms such as selection and 
socialization (Snell, 1992). The more recent framework by Speklé (2001) draws on transaction cost 
                                                     
3 Only the first four structures are applicable to the sampling frame of this study (see Section 4). Professional 
bureaucracies and political organizations are not usually business firms, and the divisionalized form sits outside the 
level of analysis.  
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economics (TCE) to explain control structure choice. Speklé presents nine types, five of these – arm’s 
length, machine bureaucratic (action and results oriented), exploratory, and boundary – refer to forms of 
hierarchical control.4 Similarly, Vosselman (2002) employs TCE to explain the adoption of horizontal 
control structures. Although horizontal control is not the focus of the present study, Vosselman contrasts 
these to two hierarchical types, strongly bureaucratic and weakly bureaucratic, which are variations on 
Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
The ideal types relevant to this study, from the typologies discussed, are described in Table 1. These 
provide a theoretical foundation for assessing the control configurations commonly formed in practice. 
Speklé (2001, p. 439) writes that his ideal types are constructs that “help to recognize and expound 
general tendencies” while Mintzberg (1979, p. 473) suggests that “a great many organizations […] tend to 
design structures rather close to one of the configurations” presented in his framework. However, as 
conceptual constructions, ideal types may not be descriptively accurate in every respect and observed 
control configurations may not always fall neatly into pre-defined categories (Speklé, 2001). 
 
One way to refine and extend conceptual frameworks is by exploring the actual control configurations 
formed in practice. Empirically derived configurations (i.e., taxonomies) can provide more complete 
descriptions of how controls tend to combine and identify alternative control patterns not captured or 
explained by existing frameworks. Currently there are few empirical observations to draw upon in the 
accounting literature, with just three main empirical studies at the firm level. In analyzing a variety of 
management techniques, accounting practices, and competitive strategies, Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 
(1998) provide support for the idea that internally consistent arrangements enhance firm performance. 
Moores and Yuen (2001) investigate variation in MA systems across organizational life-cycle stages, 
showing how reliance on accounting information varies in response to changes in strategy and 
organizational complexity, while Henri (2008) constructs a taxonomy of performance measurement 
systems and analyses contextual variation. Although these studies are informative, they present partial 
examinations of how accounting forms part of the wider package of controls. Moores and Yuen (2001) 
and Henri (2008) focus their analysis of control structures to the formal information characteristics of 
accounting and performance measurement systems. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) include a wider 
                                                     
4 Boundary and arm’s-length control are not viable control alternatives at the firm level. Arms-length control is 
characteristic of relationships between corporate management and divisions in some conglomerate firms, while 
boundary control is likely to be limited to control of specialized departments. The remaining types are market based 
control or market-bureaucratic hybrid forms. 
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array of mechanisms, although many control mechanisms known to be employed at the firm level, such as 
administrative and socio-ideological controls, are excluded (Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
 
Given the relatively few systematic insights available, this study treats the problem of how controls 
commonly combine, and the role of accounting within these configurations, as an empirical question. The 
first research question is formalized as follows: 
 
RQ1: What are the common control configurations in practice? What is the role of accounting in 
these configurations? 
 
Configuration theory argues that firms will select the internally consistent control structure best suited to 
contextual conditions. An extensive body of contingency-based research highlights significant factors 
associated with the design and use of accounting and other control mechanisms (Chenhall, 2003). This 
research suggests that if the empirically derived configurations represent valid groupings, each unique 
control combination will be aligned to different firm contexts. Furthermore, it implies that contextual 
factors predict firm membership of control configurations. This expectation is central to taxonomic 
construction, as “ultimately, the utility of any classification scheme relies on its ability to generate insight 
or to advance a predictive task” (Miller, 1996, p. 507). There are, however, likely to be limitations to 
predictive capacity. In contrast to the typical assumptions of contingency research, the associations 
between control and context are not presumed to be necessarily linear, symmetric, or continuous. As 
internal consistency tends to be favoured over external alignment, changes in context are not always 
associated with changes in control structure. Multiple control configurations may also be able to operate 
within the same contextual circumstances (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). With these caveats in mind, the 
following research question is posed: 
 
RQ2: What contexts are associated with each configuration? Does context predict configuration 
membership? 
 
A final concern relates to equilibrium assumptions. As noted, it is expected that organizations stabilize 
around the control configuration that is most effective for a given context. Idiosyncratic shifts in 
conditions mean, however, that not all (or possibly few) organizations are in an optimal position, but 
given switching costs and performance benefits of an internally consistent arrangement, the alternative 
currently in place represents the most economically viable. Some organizations will have low 
performance. When the cost of contextual misalignment outweighs the benefit of internal consistency, 
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organizations make the disruptive shift to a new system state. However, as episodes of stability are 
generally much longer than reorientations, the number of organizations in transition at any point in time 
should be small (Miller, 1982; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Organizations are expected to be, on 
average, in equilibrium.5 It is assumed then, that empirically derived configurations represent practically 
viable alternatives. Infeasible combinations are unlikely to be found – either they never arise or quickly 
die out (Williamson, 1991).  
 
3. Research framework 
 
This section details the categories of control and context, and the selection of constructs, used to explore 
the research questions. 
 
3.1 Control 
Management control refers to a set of processes and mechanisms used by managers to influence the 
behaviour of individuals and groups towards more or less predetermined objectives (Flamholtz et al., 
1985; Langfield-Smith, 2007; Speklé, 2001). The array of mechanisms that form part of management 
control efforts is extensive. This poses a distinct challenge for inquiry into control configurations, as there 
is an inevitable “need to balance parsimony and exhaustiveness of coverage” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 
433). A common empirical strategy to reduce this variety to more manageable portions is to factor 
analyse a list of control attributes applicable to a sample of firms (e.g., Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 
1998; Simons, 1987). While this method certainly has merit, control literature has not advanced to a stage 
that allows for an easy prioritization of the items that should be included. A more constructive approach is 
to specify the theoretical categories of control a priori, with the selection of constructs providing 
comprehensive coverage of those categories. In this respect there is a better-developed stream of research 
delineating the core dimensions of control to draw upon (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Brickley et al., 
2004; Daft and Macintosh, 1984; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Fisher, 1995; Flamholtz, 1983; Flamholtz et 
al., 1985; Langfield-Smith, 2007; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012; Ouchi, 
1977, 1979; Simons, 1995). While not circumventing the problem of achieving an appropriate balance of 
control mechanisms, this literature provides a stronger conceptual basis for construct selection. 
 
The control categories used in this study are as follows: planning, measurement, compensation, structure, 
policies and procedures, and socio-ideological. These categories encapsulate a relatively broad 
conceptualization of control, similar in intent and coverage to the more recent work of Malmi and Brown 
                                                     
5 This represents the congruence form of configuration fit (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). 
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(2008), while retaining core elements and comparability with frameworks already established in the 
literature (e.g., Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012).6 The control constructs included in the empirical 
analysis are detailed in Table 2.7 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Strategic planning involves establishing long-term goals, expectations, and courses of action (Daft and 
Macintosh, 1984; Flamholtz, 1983; Langfield-Smith, 2007).8 In its most overt form, planning achieves 
goal-congruence through the pre-determination of activities and behaviours required to realize desired 
objectives. Planning may also be used as a coordinative mechanism by formally articulating and 
communicating goals and schedules to individuals involved in particular activities across an organization. 
Variations in the strategic planning process are frequently conceptualized along a continuum ranging 
from formalized and systematic approaches to processes that are informal and emergent (Brews and Hunt, 
1999; Mintzberg, 1994).  
 
Measurement refers to the “process of assigning numbers to represent aspects of organizational behaviour 
and performance” (Flamholtz, 1983, p. 156). While this encapsulates much of the formal information 
produced by an organization, the focus here is the accounting information used by management to 
                                                     
6 Control categories are discrete but are not necessarily unrelated. For instance, measurement and compensation 
systems would be tightly coupled in control structures premised on cybernetic regulation, while in other 
configurations they may operate quite independently. Constructs within categories can also be closely associated, 
such as the use of standardization (specifying how an activity is to be performed) and boundary controls (defining 
the domain of acceptable activity) in a conventional bureaucracy. In organic control structures standardization has 
more limited application, although boundary systems may feature quite prominently as a means for managers to 
focus subordinate behaviours without removing the capacity for autonomous action. Boundary systems would be 
common to both control arrangements, but it is how this mechanism is combined in a package that is important for 
understanding different control outcomes. 
7 Arguments can be made for the inclusion of additional or alternative control mechanisms, but it is maintained that 
the current selection provides a sufficiently comprehensive coverage of each category. Furthermore, not every 
possible variable needs to be included in a configuration analysis for valid patterns to emerge, particularly if 
variables are highly correlated. For instance, a notable omission is formalization, which has strong conceptual ties to 
a number of other constructs (e.g., boundary systems, belief systems) and empirically it is highly correlated with 
standardization. Including formalization would result in significant overlap and little incremental information useful 
for constructing and interpreting configurations. 
8 Conventional frameworks associate control with strategic implementation rather than formulation (Langfield-
Smith, 2007). However, Ferreira and Otley (2009) argue that strategic planning is an important control mechanism 
for aligning individual behaviours to the overall mission of the organization. Recent empirical work also includes 
strategic planning as part of the control package (e.g., Davila and Foster, 2007). Action planning is identified as a 
distinct control category in some frameworks (e.g., Malmi and Brown, 2008), but here short-term planning 
mechanisms are captured by the categories of measurement and policies and procedures. 
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influence the behaviour of subordinates (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Brickley et al., 2004).9 To understand 
the control implications of accounting it is necessary to identify what is measured and how that 
information becomes incorporated into control efforts. Traditionally, accounting concerns the use of 
budgets and standard costs to measure productivity and efficiency (Covaleski and Aiken, 1986). 
Contemporary applications see a wider spectrum of activities being subject to calculation, increasing the 
potential sphere of individual accountability. Even without other applications, the very act of 
measurement serves a rather subtle, ex-ante control function. Flamholtz (1983, p. 156) refers to this as the 
process function of accounting, whereby individuals direct their efforts towards areas that are measured. 
In much of the literature the analysis of accounting is limited to its role in performance evaluation, but 
more recent understandings have emphasized the wider control functions of accounting (Hartmann, 2000; 
Chapman, 1997). Highly influential in this respect is Simons (1995), who distinguishes between 
conventional, feedback applications of accounting, operating on an exception-basis, and their use in 
proactive engagements with subordinates to address strategic uncertainties and to foster experimentation 
and opportunity search. Targets embedded in formal measurement systems are also important for 
designating individual accountability (Merchant, 1985; Van der Stede, 2001). Tightly circumscribed 
accountabilities serve to define responsibilities and restrict subordinate discretion. 
 
Compensation is both an ex-ante and ex-post control (Flamholtz et al., 1985). As an ex-ante mechanism, 
compensation incentivizes goal congruent behaviour through the anticipation or expectation of receiving a 
reward for task performance. Compensation functions as an ex-post control by rewarding outcomes and 
serving as part of the feedback process, which provides information on the desirability of past behaviours 
and correct for deviations. Compensation methods vary significantly across firms (Bonner and Sprinkle, 
2002). The most examined attributes concern the extent of performance-based compensation use, the 
method of determination, either through subjective assessments or through predetermined standards of 
performance, and the time horizon (Fisher, 1995; Flamholtz, 1983). Rewards may also be extrinsic or 
intrinsic. However, the design of compensation systems as part of the evaluation-reward process is 
primarily concerned with the provision of tangible, financial rewards. 
 
Structure concerns the specification of roles and the patterns of authority and communication within an 
organization (Chenhall, 2003; Flamholtz, 1983). Empirical MA research generally considers structure as a 
                                                     
9 Flamholtz (1983) categorizes both accounting systems and information systems within measurement systems. 
Accounting is limited to “measures of financial and managerial performance,” while information systems refer to 
operational and non-financial metrics (Flamholtz, 1983, p. 156). Contemporary usage of the term accounting in MA 
research is more or less synonymous with measurement, although it is recognized that some information systems, 
such as those used by human resources or project management systems, may not be considered accounting yet fit the 
definition of measurement. 
11 
 
contextual variable. However, structural mechanisms contribute to managerial control efforts in a number 
of ways. Some structural attributes, such as centralization, directly influence control by determining who 
has decision rights over non-programmable events. Other aspects of structural design influence the 
variability of subordinate behaviours. More bureaucratic structures with vertical hierarchies and 
mechanistic patterns of communication promote behavioural conformity, while flatter, more organic, and 
integrative structures enable greater flexibility through mutual adjustment. 
 
Policies and procedures refer to control mechanisms concerned with directly specifying how tasks are to 
be performed or the limits to allowable behaviours (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2012).10 When the actions required to achieve effective task outcomes are known control can be 
achieved by closely monitoring adherence to standardized rules and procedures (Ouchi, 1977). When 
tasks are non-routine or the context is inherently uncertain, managers can restrict individual discretion by 
specifying boundaries to acceptable conduct or by implementing formal approval procedures. Boundary 
controls enable subordinates to respond to local contingencies autonomously but within predefined limits 
(Simons, 1995), while pre-action reviews provide a mechanism to guide or restrict proposed activities 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012). 
 
Socio-ideological controls are mechanisms that “persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms and 
ideas about what is good, important, praiseworthy, etc. in terms of work and organizational life” 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p. 4).11 Despite receiving scant attention in empirical research, the 
importance of socio-ideological controls has long been recognized (Ouchi, 1979; Flamholtz, 1983; Fisher, 
1995). While it is improbable that managers have the ability to fabricate an entire culture, they are 
typically in a stronger position than others to mould or sustain the practices that encourage internalization 
of desired norms and values (Flamholtz, 1983). The main control mechanisms available are selection, 
socialization, and formal communication of organizational values and beliefs (Harrison and Carrol, 1991; 
Snell, 1992; Chatman, 1991; Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995).12 Formally instituted procedures are not the 
only mechanisms that influence individual acculturation. The construct social control is included to 
capture the effects of informal processes that result in employees accumulating values and basic 
assumptions infused within the symbols, rituals, language, and social structures of the organization 
                                                     
10 Policies and procedures are closely associated to the categories of behaviour and action controls (Ouchi, 1977; 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012). 
11 Socio-ideological control is preferred to the more common label of cultural control (Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012), which is not always clearly differentiated from the related but distinct terms of 
informal and clan controls (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Langfield-Smith, 2007). 
12 Selection and socialization are also referred to in the literature as personnel, ex-ante, and input controls 
(Flamholtz, 1983; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012; Snell, 1992; Widener, 2004). 
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(Schein, 2004). The higher the degree of crystallization of shared values and the more socially cohesive 
the organization, the greater the level of normative pressure on newcomers to conform to prevailing social 
norms, providing an indirect but potentially powerful source of control. 
 
3.2 Context 
To analyse variation in the operating conditions of control combinations a set of contextual factors is 
identified from prior literature.13 The comprehensive review by Chenhall (2003) guided initial selection. 
Chenhall details the primary dimensions that influence management control choice: technology, external 
environment, structure, strategy, size, and national culture. Two are excluded: structure, because it is 
conceptualized as part of management control, and culture, as this study has been conducted in a single 
national context. Table 3 presents definitions of the contextual constructs for technology, environment, 
and strategy. Constructs are selected based on conceptual coverage of each dimension and prior 
theoretical and empirical research to support systematic association with management controls at the firm 
level of analysis. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Size, age, and stock exchange listing are also included as additional factors. Although few MA studies 
have explicitly considered these variables they have potentially significant consequences for management 
control. Research consistently reports strong associations between size and adoption of bureaucratic 
control structures (Astley, 1985; Donaldson, 2001), with age having a similar relationship (Davila, 2005; 
Mintzberg, 1979). The specific demands on information disclosure imposed by public listing necessitate 
increased measurement controls, while associated governance requirements entail greater emphasis upon 
policies and procedures (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012). 
 
4. Research method 
 
4.1 Sample 
Data were obtained from a mail survey conducted in Australia. The population sample was acquired from 
the Certified Practicing Accountants of Australia (CPAA). A random sample of 1500 firms was selected 
                                                     
13 The term context is used instead of contingency for three reasons. First, it avoids the deterministic connotation 
that contingency carries (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). Second, the contextual factors are external to what has been 
defined as the management control structure, but this is not meant to imply an actual separation in reality. Third, it is 
recognized that an organization is likely to have some degree of influence over its context and all factors are choice 
variables for the firm at least at one point in time (Fisher, 1995). 
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from their database. Firms are independent companies or strategic business units (SBU).14 To ensure that 
control and contextual variables were applicable to the respondent it was required that firms have a 
minimum size of 100 employees and at least AUD 20 million in revenues. Through cross-checking 
minimum requirements against Dun and Bradstreet and Hoovers databases, 107 firms were removed, 
leaving a useable population of 1393. 
 
Survey administration was conducted over three months. Targeted respondents are the highest member of 
the top management team whose details were available in the CPAA database.15 Some are chief executive 
officers or general managers while others are responsible for functions such as accounting, finance and 
operations. Initial telephone calls were made to generate interest in the research, ensure that firm 
characteristics are appropriate for this study, and check that respondents had sufficient knowledge of 
questionnaire content. In total, 911 respondents who satisfied the criteria agreed to participate. Surveys 
were sent out within a week of contacting each respondent. Reminder postcards were sent one and a half 
weeks after initial mailing and a further telephone call was made to non-respondents after three weeks 
(Dillman, 2000). The process generated a response rate of 46.2 percent with 421 returned surveys. To test 
for non-response bias the size and industry of respondent firms are compared to the initial sample with no 
significant differences detected (p<0.05). Additionally, comparison of construct means between the first 
and last 20 percent of surveys received reveal no meaningful differences. 
 
The analysis uses 400 responses. Responses are removed if they failed to meet the criteria of this study or 
have significant missing data.16 Surveys where one or more items appeared to have been missed 
inadvertently are retained. Missing values are imputed using the expectation-maximization process.17 
Demographic data for the usable sample is shown in Table 4. 
 




                                                     
14 This definition is consistent with prior management control research at the firm level (e.g., Chenhall, 2005; 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Henri, 2006). All firms appear as separate entities in the CPAA, Dun and 
Bradstreet, and Hoovers databases. 
15 Top management team is defined as the top two tiers of an organization’s management structure (e.g., CEO/GM, 
COO, CFO, and the next highest level of management) (Henri, 2006). 
16 In some cases respondents failed to answer items of entire constructs (e.g., they missed full pages of the 
questionnaire). These responses are excluded from the analysis. 
17 Data are shown to be missing completely at random (p>0.10). The expectation-maximization method is applied as 
it has negligible impact upon mean, covariance and correlation parameters (Hair et al., 2006). 
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4.2 Variable measurement 
Where possible previously validated constructs are used or adapted to fit the requirements of this study. 
However, a number of new constructs are developed as prior measurements are inadequate or are not 
available. Extensive pilot testing of the survey instrument was undertaken to enhance content validity. 
This involved 10 interviews with senior managers from medium-to-large organizations in manufacturing 
and service industries. The purpose of the interviews was to refine the selection of constructs, assess 
consistency in interpretation of survey items, and remove any undue complexity or ambiguity in item 
wording. To further establish content and face validity nine academics in the management control 
discipline reviewed the survey. 
 
The measurement model guidelines of Rossiter (2002) and Jarvis et al. (2003) are applied in the 
development or modification of constructs. The distinction between different measurement models is 
important as incorrect specification can have adverse consequences. For instance, if a reflective model is 
selected when indicators are in fact defining facets of the construct, then replacing or removing indicators 
may alter the construct’s conceptual domain and theoretical meaning. This can result in flawed 
interpretations of empirical tests (Bisbe et al., 2007; Jarvis et al., 2003). In some cases existing literature 
indicates the most appropriate measurement model (e.g., the specification of interactive control by Bisbe 
et al., 2007). Otherwise the selection of reflective or formative models is based upon construct definitions. 
Measurement of each construct is described in detail in the appendix. Likert-type scales from 1 to 7 are 
used unless otherwise indicated. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5 and bivariate correlations 
are presented in Table 6. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
For reflective measurement models, unidimensionality is evaluated through common factor analysis using 
Maximum-Likelihood extraction with oblique rotation. Internal consistency is assessed by calculating 
Cronbach alphas. Factor analyses indicate that items load strongly on single factors (>0.35) with 
satisfactory alphas (between 0.67 and 0.90). As indicators need not covary in formative constructs 
conventional tests of validity and reliability are inappropriate (Bisbe et al., 2007). Petter et al. (2007) 
recommend examining the weightings and multicollinearity of construct items. Item weightings are 
examined through principal components analysis. Items on all formative constructs are positive and have 
weights above the recommended minimum of 0.30 (Hair et al., 2006). Variance inflation factors (VIF) are 
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calculated to assess multicollinearity. The maximum VIF of 4.13 is below the general threshold of 10 
(Hair et al., 2006).18 Multicollinearity is assessed through a condition index. The highest value of 5.37 on 
the condition index is below the general tolerance of 30 (Hair et al., 2006). Harman’s one-factor test is 
conducted to assess for common-rater bias. An unrotated principal components analysis shows that the 
first factor explains less than the majority of variance, suggesting that single-source bias is not a 




Cluster analysis is employed to examine the first research question. This technique is consistent with 
configuration theory as it attempts to locate homogenous, mutually exclusive groupings within a 
population (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). The 22 control mechanism variables outlined in Table 2 are 
included in a two stage clustering process (Ketchen and Shook, 1996).19 In the first stage the number of 
clusters and centroids are determined through a hierarchical agglomerative procedure using Ward’s 
algorithm with squared Euclidean distance. This clustering algorithm is appropriate as it factors in both 
intra-cluster homogeneity and inter-cluster differentiation (Everitt et al., 2001). However, the approach 
can be sensitive to outliers and construct scaling (Hair et al., 2006). Constructs are Z-score standardized to 
minimize the effect of different measurement scales, while tests for the effect of multivariate outliers find 
minimal differences in cluster solutions.20  
 
The five cluster solution is used in the analysis. This partition is selected because of the interpretability of 
the clusters with respect to prior literature and the support of supplementary analyses. Examination of the 
dendogram indicates significant jumps between two to five clusters, while the Duda-Hart index, a 
stopping rule, supports two, five, and nine cluster solutions. These alternate cluster partitions are 
examined. Partitions of two to four clusters provide less fine-grained detail in the variation between 
clusters, while the nine cluster solution produces clusters with significant overlap providing little 
                                                     
18 Although a cut-off of 10 is commonly applied more restrictive thresholds are suggested in the literature as low as 
3.33 (Petter et al., 2007). Only one item has a VIF above 3.33 in the construct belief systems. Removal of this item 
would affect the conceptual domain of the construct and hence it is retained. 
19 Contextual variables are excluded from the clustering process. First, configuration theory indicates that it is 
possible for organizations to use similar control configurations in different contexts. As cluster analysis attempts to 
find mutually exclusive groupings, including contextual variables in the analysis would limit the potential for 
equifinality to be identified. Second, this study examines whether contextual variables differ significantly between 
configurations, that is, whether they have predictive validity. Variables included in the cluster analysis cannot be 
used to test the predictive validity of the classification as these would significantly bias the result. 
20 A Mahalanobis distance (D2) test is conducted (Hair et al., 2006). The analysis indicates that six cases are possible 
outliers (p<0.001). Visual inspection does not suggest any unusual patterns. Removal of these cases has minimal 
impact on cluster formation. All cases are retained. 
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additional insight. Replication with alternate clustering algorithms demonstrates that the five cluster 
solution presented is stable.21 
 
The centroids from the five cluster hierarchical solution are used in the second clustering stage. Here a 
non-hierarchical procedure (K-means clustering) that allows switching of cluster membership is applied 
(Hair et al., 2006). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 7. Differences in cluster patterns are 
examined through analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Games-Howell post-hoc multiple comparison 
procedures (MCP).22 Clusters are labelled as simple (C1), results (C2), action (C3), devolved (C4), and 
hybrid (C5). Labels are based on the cluster interpretations detailed in the following section. 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
The second research question asks whether contextual variables vary between, and are able to predict 
membership of, control configurations. Contextual attributes of each cluster are shown in Table 8 with 
results of ANOVA and MCP.23 The predictive power of the contextual variables is assessed using 
predictive discriminant analysis (PDA).24 The results of PDA are shown in Table 9.25 The correctly 
categorized cases (the “hit rate”) as a number or percentage are listed along the diagonal from top to 
bottom. Overall, 54 percent of cases are correctly classified.26 To establish significance the hit rate is 
compared to threshold values of the maximum chance criterion (MCC), the proportional chance criterion 
(PCC), and Press’s Q statistic (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).27 The hit rate is well above 
the threshold values of 30.25 percent for MCC and 21.7 percent for PCC, while the Q value of 289 
                                                     
21 The clustering process is repeated with alternate hierarchical (within-group) and non-hierarchical (K-means) 
algorithms. The within-group procedure has a correspondence of 85.8 percent to the cluster membership from 
Ward’s method, while the non-hierarchical procedure results in 75.8 percent of cases with equivalent cluster 
membership. A small number of statistical differences are found in comparison to mean scores reported in Table 7 
but these do not substantively affect cluster interpretation. 
22 Kruskal-Wallis tests return equivalent results as ANOVA. 
23 Chi-square tests with Bonferroni pairwise comparisons are conducted to assess differences in industry association 
across clusters. There are no significant results (p<0.05). 
24 Results of MANOVA (p<0.001) indicate that the contextual variables reported in Table 6 are valid predictors of 
cluster membership, and hence can be used for classification (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
25 As the research is exploratory the PDA results are based on the conservative assumption of equal prior 
probabilities (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
26 To cross-validate the result an additional jackknife procedure termed “leave-one-out” is performed. This method 
calculates the discriminant functions using N-1 cases, repeated N times. The procedure returns a similar pattern of 
categorization across groups and an overall hit rate of 45.5 percent. 
27 The MCC and PCC provide hit rates expected by chance. The MCC is the hit ratio if all cases were classified in 
the largest group, whereas the PCC takes into account all groups weighted by relative size. 
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exceeds the critical value of 6.63 (p=0.01). Overall the results show that context differs significantly 
across clusters and has predictive validity. 
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 
6. Analysis of results 
 
This section provides an interpretation of the five clusters reported in the previous section. Interpretations 
are based on the statistical differences reported in Tables 7 and 8 and comparison to prior theoretical 
frameworks.28 The intent of this analysis is twofold. The first is to provide an understanding of the control 
logic underpinning each configuration.29 The second is to further validate the cluster solution. While the 
results show that contextual factors have significant capacity to predict cluster membership, supporting 
the relevance of the clusters, there is no available method to determine whether the solution presented is 
optimal. Analytical validation can, however, be achieved through generalization to existing conceptual 
frameworks and empirical (primarily case-based) research describing complex control structures in 
contemporary practice (Lindsay, 1995; Yin, 1989). 
 
6.1 Simple control (C1) 
The relatively unelaborated pattern that emerges in C1 suggests that the basis for control and coordination 
is largely informal, achieved through centralized decision-making (<C2,C4,C5), restricted autonomy and 
direct supervision (<C2,C4,C5). The centralization of power and informality of this control structure 
permits significant flexibility in responding to environmental shifts and setting the strategic direction of 
the firm. The informal strategic planning process (<all) and limited involvement of subordinates (<C4,C5) 
suggests that strategy resides largely in the minds of top management, with formulation intuitive and 
implementation potentially rapid, unimpeded by bureaucratic formalities. Upper management may also be 
involved in task execution, coordinating activities through direct involvement. Alternatively, guidelines 
for task accomplishment issued by top management may be quite vague, with trust placed in the 
competence and tacit knowledge of subordinates, as suggested by the reasonably high emphasis on 
                                                     
28 Statistical differences are reported in parentheses throughout the analysis. Those indicated by an asterisk (*) are 
significant at p<0.10. All others are significant at p<0.05 or better. 
29 Control logic is an extension of the broader concept of “dominant logic” - the general “principles of organizing” 
that are “encoded in the minds of organizational actors (or agents) who create institutions” (Drazin et al, 2004, p. 
165). Bettis and Prahalad (1995, p. 10) argue, “organizational structure and systems [...] are tightly coupled to the 
dominant logic and embody parts of it”. These logics are conceptually similar to “deep structures” which, consistent 
with configuration theory, act to stabilize the organization and resist forces for change: “logic guides the 
development of structure [which] once in place, tend to delimit the further development of managerial logic” 
(Drazin et al, 2004, p. 164). 
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personnel selection (=C2,C4). This description closely resembles Mintzberg’s structural type of the same 
name and the interpersonal control strategy outlined by Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) and Merchant 
(1981). However, there is some evidence of a basic hierarchical structure, with vertical differentiation 
(hierarchy) the same as more bureaucratic structures (C2,C3,C5), and although less than other clusters, 
diagnostic control is one of the more prominent attributes within this configuration. The extent to which 
control is achieved through personal contact or through basic bureaucratic structuring will be in part a 
function of size and age (Astley, 1985), but is also likely to be strongly influenced by the leadership style 
of top management (Mintzberg, 1979). 
 
Contextual factors indicate that simple control is observed in smaller sized, non-listed firms (<C5). C1 
contains more early stage firms than most other clusters (forty-two percent), although this is not 
statistically different. Administrative technology is significantly lower than all other clusters, consistent 
with the generally lower emphasis placed on bureaucratic control mechanisms. However, when a firm has 
both an imperfect understanding of transformation processes and an inability to reliably measure 
outcomes it is expected that control will be premised on socio-ideological mechanisms (Ouchi, 1979). Yet 
C1 exhibits the lowest emphasis on these controls. A potential explanation is that early-stage firms are 
unlikely to exhibit the preconditions of a long and stable membership necessary to develop the kind of 
thick social understandings and intense commitment to collective values required for clan formation 
(Alvesson and Lindkvist, 1993). As firms mature, they tend to adopt more bureaucratic structures, even if 
the control configuration remains relatively basic. The presence of these basic bureaucratic arrangements 
limits the potential for clan controls to dominate, suggesting that a pure-type clan will be a relatively rare 
form of control in practice.30 
 
6.2 Results (C2) and action (C3) control 
Firms in C2 place a high emphasis on diagnostic and tight application of accounting information and 
objectively determined, performance-based compensation (>C1,C3,C4). This suggests a control structure 
consistent with output (Ouchi, 1977) and administrative (Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 1981) 
control strategies, and the results-oriented variant of the machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979; Speklé, 
2001). Strategy formation takes place at the apex of the organization with limited participation (<C4,C5), 
although the process is not overly formalized (<C3,C5) possibly because primary attention is directed 
towards short-term financial performance (<C3,C4,C5). Implementation is top-down, with formal, 
                                                     
30 This generalization is limited to the characteristics of the current sample: for-profit organizations of medium to 
large size. Clan-type arrangements may be more prevalent, for example, in relatively mature but small-sized 




vertical channels of communication containing directives and performance feedback (<C4,C5). Through 
exception-based monitoring, managers are able to maintain control at a distance, intervening periodically 
to modify behaviours when the organization deviates from expected outcomes. This allows for individual 
autonomy and delegation of decision rights (>C1,C3), providing some flexibility in the way local 
contingencies are handled (Speklé, 2001). However, the selective emphasis on performance dimensions 
and their rigid enforcement serve to impose definite parameters on subordinate activity. The constraining 
nature of the accounting apparatus may explain why, apart from selection, socio-ideological mechanisms 
have relatively little importance for control (<C3,C4,C5). This comes down to the way accounting 
controls are mobilized as the primary intermediary for individual accountability (Hopwood, 1972). 
Hierarchical accountability systems act to internalize efficiency and productivity as dominant 
organizational norms, providing the ideological basis for individual action (Roberts, 1991). 
 
The control logic in C3 appears to have the same bureaucratic underpinnings as the results configuration, 
but with a different set of mechanisms accomplishing individual accountability. Control is based on 
centralized authority, direct monitoring and restricted autonomy (<C2,C4,C5), formal planning 
(>C1,C2,C4), standardized rules and procedures (>C1,C2,C4) and well-defined boundaries of conduct 
(>C1,C5). Firms exhibit a tall hierarchy (>C4) and vertical, routinized and restricted patterns of 
communication (>C4,C5) that serve to reinforce positional authority and hierarchical accountability 
(Mintzberg, 1979). These characteristics are consistent with a behavioural control strategy (Ouchi, 1977), 
the action-oriented variant of the machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979; Speklé, 2001) and the 
mechanistic-type organization (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Although C2 emphasizes broad-scope 
information (>C1,C2; =C3), diagnostic and tight use of accounting is significantly lower than results 
control (C2), as is the use of performance-based compensation, suggesting that accounting has reduced 
importance for securing individual performances. Instead accounting may function as a supplement to the 
direct observations of top management in the evaluation of task execution, forming part of the feedback 
loop in refining the specifications of roles and procedures. Somewhat inconsistent with conventional 
bureaucratic logic, however, is the relatively high emphasis upon lateral integrative devices (>C1,C2*; 
=C4,C5) and socio-ideological mechanisms (>C1,C2; =C3). 
 
The choice between action and results control structures is typically attributed to the relative availability 
of information (administrative technology) – results control structures applicable when information is 
available to accurately capture achievement of desired outcomes and action control suitable when tasks 
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can be programmed and monitored (Ouchi, 1977; Eisenhardt, 1985).31 However, the results in Table 6 
show no significant differences between C2 and C3 on either dimension. Instead C2 and C3 are separated 
by environmental factors. Results control (C2) is associated with relatively predictable (<C3*,C4) and 
stable (<C3*,C5) environments, which are considered necessary prerequisites for control strategies that 
hold subordinates tightly accountable to predetermined targets. Action control firms (C3) are found to 
operate in more unpredictable, turbulent, and hostile environments. This is in contrast to conventional 
thought that mechanistic-type structures are most “appropriate to an enterprise operating under relatively 
stable conditions” (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p. 5). These findings suggest an alternate interpretation of the 
logic underpinning the action control configuration. 
 
Recent studies have revealed the capacity for some organizations to perform in highly dynamic 
environments by activating bureaucratic structures in a flexible and enabling fashion (e.g., Adler et al., 
1999; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Bigley and Roberts, 2001). The firms in these case studies share the 
conventional hallmarks of bureaucracy – an emphasis on hierarchical relations, centralized authority, and 
the structuring of tasks through an extensive array of formalized rules, routines, and operating procedures 
– but without the characteristic rigidities that prevent adaptation to dynamic environmental conditions. 
Although this research is conducted at an operational level, a similar logic might be applicable for 
understanding control by top management at the firm-level.  One interpretation of the accountability 
structure in C3 is that top management monitors actions not to enforce adherence to rules and procedures 
but to ensure flexible adjustment. Accounting is present but unlike the results-oriented bureaucracy it is 
not privileged as a source of control. Combined with lateral integrative devices and an emphasis on 
ideological cohesion, information conveyed by accounting systems may be “interpreted and understood 
within the shared context of extensive mutual knowledge” (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 451). This is 
suggestive of a “socializing” style of accountability, which may impart a far greater ability for flexibility 
and adaptation (Mouritsen, 1999) – quite different from the “individualizing” effects characteristic of 
conventional bureaucratic control (Roberts, 1991). 
 
There are no other significant differences between the contextual attributes of C2 and C3. Compared to 
other clusters, results control firms show no significant differences on competitive strategy, apart from 
customer focus (<C5), indicating that results control firms pursue a range of strategic priorities, including 
innovation. However, as individual accountabilities are strongly tied to short-term performance, any 
innovative efforts are likely to be directed towards incremental, rather than radical, projects, which carry 
                                                     
31 When information is available to feasibly pursue either control approach, results-control will be preferred because 
“it tends to require less elaborate structuring, [...] is likely to demand less higher level involvement, and is more 
supportive of adaptation” (Speklé, 2001, p. 429). 
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less risk and uncertainty (March, 1991). For the action configuration, there is an emphasis on customer 
focus and flexibility (>C5), but not innovation (<C4,C5). This is consistent with the recent empirical 
evidence of flexible and enabling bureaucracies just outlined. All cases illustrated firms responding to 
immediate operational contingencies or customer demands, through existing information structures. 
Whereas interactive, organic and fluid networks facilitate radical experimentation and speculative 
exploration in generating new knowledge, the enabling aspects of bureaucratic structures are more suited 
to assimilating, re-combining, and exploiting existing knowledge to cope with localized, day-to-day 
uncertainties (Davila et al., 2009). The redesign of old routines and generation of novel actions may be an 
occasional outcome, but not the norm for the flexible bureaucracy. 
 
6.3 Devolved control (C4) 
The fourth cluster exhibits a flat hierarchy (>all), emergent and lateral communication channels (>all), 
employment of integrative liaison devices (>C1,C2; =C3,C5), significant individual autonomy 
(>C1,C2,C3), long-term performance assessment (>all), reliance on socialization processes and social 
controls (>C1,C3,C5), and reduced emphasis on standardized behavioural routines (<C2,C6) and 
predetermined performance targets (<C2,C5). Such features are prevalent in discussions of new forms of 
organizing – such as network, flexible, heterarchical, and post-bureaucratic (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000) – 
but are also characteristic of earlier types such as the organic structure of Burns and Stalker (1961) and 
the adhocracy of Mintzberg (1979). The central thread of these structures is a shift in the locus of 
authority from managers to subordinates, where coordination primarily occurs through self-organization 
and mutual adjustment, such that “control of the work rests in the hands of the doers” (Mintzberg, 1979, 
p. 3). C3 is labelled devolved control to reflect this common trait. 
 
Available means for managers to influence behaviours in organic-type structures are often assumed to be 
quite limited and largely informal in nature, centred upon active engagements in lateral coordination and 
the shaping of shared expectations (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg, 1979). The relatively high levels 
of subordinate participation in strategic planning (>C1,C2,C3*) and communication of organizational 
values through belief systems (>C1,C2) are consistent with this. But in contrast to prior ideal type 
descriptions there is a rather strong presence of formal control mechanisms. Boundary controls and pre-
action reviews are utilized to a similar extent as action control (C3), although combined in an otherwise 
organic structure they likely have an enabling role (Adler and Borys, 1996). Measurement systems also 
appear to be important in this configuration. Rather than tightly specifying individual accountabilities 
(<C2,C5), broad-scope (>C1,C2) accounting controls are used to direct attention, encourage novel 
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behaviours, and facilitate an open sharing of information, the latter of which Speklé (2001) argues to be 
essential in exploratory control structures for equitable performance assessments. 
 
The contextual associations of C4 are reasonably consistent with what might be expected for this type of 
configuration – unpredictable and turbulent environments (>C2*), and an emphasis on innovation 
(>C1,C3). However, there are few other variances of note. Task programmability and outcome 
measurability differ significantly from simple (C1) and hybrid (C5) firms, but not from results (C2) or 
action (C3) control structures, which is counter to prior literature that shows organic, devolved structures 
with highly autonomous individuals are more prevalent in conditions where cause-effect relations are 
unknown or ambiguous, and desired outcomes difficult to specify (Ouchi, 1977). The findings also 
indicate that devolved organizations are relatively large (=C5), and although this cluster has the highest 
percentage of early-stage firms, this is not statistically significant. Rather than being a temporary or 
transitional organizational form adopted by adolescent firms prior to undergoing bureaucratization 
(Mintzberg, 1979; Speklé, 2001), organic-type configurations may represent a more permanent mode of 
organizing. Finally, the results show that the devolved configuration has the lowest percentage of firms 
correctly classified (Table 9), suggesting that devolved control is viable under a range of contextual 
circumstances. 
 
6.3 Hybrid control (C5) 
The final cluster represents the most elaborated arrangement, characterized by an intensive and 
demanding application of accounting and a significant bureaucratic complex. C5 reveals tightly 
emphasized accountabilities (>C1,C3,C4) to a wide array of metrics (>all) coupled with strong 
performance-based incentives (>C1,C3,C4), while strategic planning, boundary systems, standardization, 
and pre-action reviews are equal or greater in emphasis than other clusters. This pattern of controls is 
consistent with the contextual attributes of administrative technology (>all), large size (>C1,C3), and age 
(highest proportion of mature age firms), which prior research shows are strongly associated with 
increased bureaucratic structuring (Astley, 1985; Chenhall, 2003; Snell, 1992). Balanced against this is a 
high level of participation in strategic planning (>C1,C2,C3), delegated decision authority (>C1,C3), 
discretion in conducting work activities (>C1,C3), moderately organic patterns of interaction (>C2,C3), 
and use of lateral integrative devices (>C1,C2), indicating quite complex modes of integration and 
coordination. Reliance on socio-ideological controls is also significantly higher than all other clusters. As 





This hybridization of multiple control modes is in contrast to the conventional assumption that firms 
emphasize a single control mode, such as results or action control (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). 
Furthermore, it is often claimed that the internalization of shared beliefs and values obviates the need for 
an extensive bureaucratic apparatus of explicit rules and formalized systems of accountability to govern 
behaviour (Alvesson and Lindkvist, 1993). What appears to be a far more prevalent occurrence is the co-
existence of traditional bureaucratic structures with those mechanisms oriented towards the normative and 
ideational spheres of individual conduct. As Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) demonstrate in a 
management consultancy firm, this interweaving of bureaucratic and socio-ideological controls may 
provide an alternative, and possibly substitutable, way of organizing in relatively dynamic and complex 
conditions. The structural tensions inherent in such a configuration, and the association with multiple 
strategic priorities, also supports theories of ambidexterity – complex combinations of mechanistic and 
organic structures are required to balance the competing objectives of efficiency and flexibility (Raisch 
and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
 
The primary motivation for this study is to provide an empirical basis for extending our understanding of 
how control mechanisms combine and the contexts in which they operate. The analysis shows that 
existing frameworks have much to say about how controls combine in contemporary practice – many of 
the configurations closely resemble the ideal type descriptions in Table 1 – yet it also reveals a much 
more complex image of organizational reality. That a more complex and “messy” picture of control 
emerges is in some sense not surprising, as theoretical categorizations are intentionally stylized, ideal 
types. But if we want to explain control structure variety within and between organizations then rich 
descriptions of the actual choices made in practice may be a prerequisite for empirically valid theoretical 
developments, or at the very least, highly instructive. The taxonomy presented in this study offers a 
number of empirical observations to advance such efforts in future research. 
 
First, the taxonomy indicates general empirical tendencies that are not adequately explained by existing 
frameworks, such as firms characterized by significant bureaucracy operating in relatively uncertain and 
dynamic conditions (C3) and others with a complex hybridization of multiple control types (C5). These 
configurations are not entirely novel as case-based research describes organizations with remarkably 
similar structures. Rather the findings indicate that these distinctly contemporary organizational forms are 
more common in practice that the literature currently suggests, and deserve further systematic 
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investigation to develop more complete explanations than offered here about how they function and the 
contexts in which they are most effective. 
 
Conversely, some ideal types might experience limited diversity – an instance where a theoretically 
possible configuration is not empirically observable (Fiss, 2007). In this study there is no evidence that 
firms commonly adopt configurations premised predominantly on socio-ideological controls. Instead, 
these controls are most prominent when combined with more complex administrative arrangements, 
suggesting that socio-ideological mechanisms are more likely to exhibit a complementary relationship 
with bureaucratic controls, rather than act as substitutes as is commonly assumed in the literature 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). In conditions where theory would suggest configurations based on 
socio-ideological controls to be the preferred structural choice – imperfect administrative information and 
relatively small size – organizations instead adopt quite basic, interpersonal control structures (C1). This 
conjecture does not invalidate the theoretical claim that clan control is a more efficient alternative to the 
basic bureaucratic arrangement shown here. Instead it points to the need for theory that more fully 
explains not only optimal types but also the actual choices observed in practice. 
 
Second, this study illustrates how accounting combines with a wide variety of control arrangements and 
contexts. Consistent with ideal type depictions the results control configuration (C2) shows accounting 
situated within a hierarchical structure operating in stable environmental conditions, while in contexts 
characterized by uncertainty, accounting is activated in an interactive fashion and combines with organic 
(C4) and flexible-bureaucratic (C3) configurations. But it would also seem that the central mechanisms of 
results control are not limited to stable contexts as they are found in relatively dynamic conditions within 
a complex array of bureaucratic and socio-ideological mechanisms (C5). These findings elaborate on 
prior work that observe formal accounting controls combining with organic structural types (Chenhall and 
Morris, 1995; Simons, 1987) and provides support for recent case studies demonstrating how accounting 
integrates with both formal and informal control structures under a variety of organizational settings (e.g., 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Frow et al., 2010; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009). Echoing the concerns of 
Caglio and Ditillo (2008, p. 875), a useful extension to existing frameworks would be to more explicitly 
recognize the combinatory potential of accounting in different control configurations, and the roles that 
accounting can perform across different contexts. 
 
Explanations of the design and use of accounting mechanisms are also likely to require knowledge of not 
only contextual conditions, but also of the wider control structure in which that mechanism resides. For 
instance, the formalized accountability structure found in the hybrid configuration (C5) would seem 
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inconsistent with relatively complex and dynamic conditions. Yet it may be able to function effectively 
because of the combination with socio-ideological controls (Davila et al., 2009). The way accounting is 
combined with other control mechanisms, in addition to the role it takes, may help to explain the paradox 
of the reliance on accounting performance measures in conditions of both predictability and uncertainty 
(Chapman, 1997; Hartmann, 2000). 
 
Finally, the findings suggest that the explanatory power of control theories will improve if the assumption 
of direct and universal associations to context is relaxed. In this study configurations are found to be 
characterized by differences and similarities - very different control arrangements are aligned to the same 
contextual dimension while in other cases control mechanisms in different configurations have equivalent 
emphasis despite variation in context. This provides empirical support for the concept of equifinality in 
control configurations. Few studies have explicitly considered this possibility, although Gerdin (2005, p. 
119) concludes from an investigation of MA systems in manufacturing departments facing multiple 
contingencies that it “may be important not to assume automatically that there is a one-to-one relationship 
between context and MCS [as] different control mechanisms available in the control package may well 
combine in different ways in a particular context”. Although the configurations presented here do not 
necessarily represent optimal alignments between control structure and context, future research can use 
these configurations as an initial basis to develop more specific hypotheses about equifinal combinations. 
One particular observation is that both the devolved configuration and the hybrid configuration are 
associated with high levels of innovation. If these configurations are equifinal with respect to innovation 
then it would explain why some studies find tight formal controls associated with higher performance in 
innovative firms (e.g., Simons, 1987) when much of the literature instead argues that control structures 
must be informal and loose (Langfield-Smith, 2007). 
 
To address these issues researchers will need to use both conventional and alternative methodological 
approaches. Path analytic techniques are able to examine the interrelationships between control 
mechanisms thereby identifying core and peripheral components in different configurational subgroups 
(e.g., Fullerton et al., 2013). Such techniques may also be able to identify relationships between control 
and contextual variables that hold for one class of configuration but are absent or reversed in another. 
Other theoretical concerns could be better addressed through methods less common to MA literature. The 
utility of cluster analysis for examining how multiple control mechanisms make up a system or package 
has been previously noted (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Gerdin, 2005). A quite different 
approach is offered by set-theoretic methods. These use Boolean algebra to assess how different variables 
combine to achieve an outcome (Fiss, 2007). One unique benefit of this approach is the ability to examine 
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necessary and sufficient causal conditions. For example, imperfect administrative information and small 
size may be necessary conditions for clan or cultural control, but the results of this study suggest they are 
not sufficient for this form to emerge. Set-theoretic approaches could further untangle the effect of 
multiple contingent variables on control structure variety. 
 
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, cluster analysis lacks the rigor of conventional 
statistics with no methods available to test the significance of the solution presented. Although replication 
with alternate clustering algorithms suggests that the clusters are relatively stable, and results indicate 
predictive validity, they should be considered as providing preliminary, rather than conclusive, evidence. 
The clusters are not meant to be exhaustive of all possible control configurations but rather representative 
of the central tendencies of common control patterns observable in practice. Like any study, the results 
should be subject to scrutiny through empirical replication. Second are the typical caveats to survey 
research, notably issues of sampling and measurement. While much effort was made to draw upon a 
generalizable sample that mirrored size and industry distributions, the database used may contain biases 
against this. Measurements are subjective assessments obtained from a single respondent. However, 
significant attention was given to construct measurement and pre-testing of the survey instrument, and 
there are no indications that single-source bias is a significant concern. Third, despite the breadth of 
attributes considered, there is scope for additional variables to be analysed as part of the control package. 
Inclusion of additional constructs, such as those that tap more directly into the enabling and coercive 
aspects of formalization, may result in alternative combinations. Despite these limitations it is hoped that 
the insights of this study into complex control configurations will contribute towards further developing 








Variable measurements, factor loadings and alphas are detailed below for the constructs used in this study. 
      
Survey items   Anchors 




      Long-term Planning 
    
      Strategic Planning (reverse scored) is measured through four items. Items based on the instruments by Brews and 
Hunt (1999) and Covin et al. (2001). End-point anchors of indicators reflect the position of an organization on a 
continuum from informal/emergent to formal/deliberate strategic planning processes, implying a reflective 
measurement model. 
      1. How would you describe the strategic goals of your 
SBU? 
Specific, detailed, 
quantified / Broad, general, 
qualitative 
0.799 0.874 
2. How would you characterise the strategic plan of your 
SBU? 
 Highly detailed, 
comprehensive outline of 
strategic actions / Little 
detail, rough outline of 
strategic actions 
0.891  
3. How closely is the strategic plan followed in your SBU?  Tightly followed, plans 
implemented as outlined / 
Loosely followed, acts as a 
guide only 
0.805  
4. How would you describe the process by which strategy 
develops in your SBU? 
 Develops through 
formalised and deliberate 
processes / Develops 
through often unintended 
and emergent processes 
0.697  
      
Planning Participation is assessed using a single item. Multi-item reflective scales based on existing measures were 
reviewed (e.g., Shields and Young, 1993), but as this question is preceded by strategic planning items it is considered 
reasonable that a respondent can make an overall assessment of subordinate participation. Prior studies also use 
single item scales to measure participation (e.g., Simons, 1987). 
   
   
1. To what extent are subordinates involved in the 
strategic planning processes of the SBU? 
Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
n/a n/a 
            
      
Measurement     
      
Diagnostic Control is measured through five items that represent the use of accounting as part of a cybernetic control 
cycle (Simons, 1995). Items are based on Henri (2006), Widener (2007) and the descriptions of Simons. 
   
   
 
To what extent does the top management team use 
budgets (performance measurement systems) for the 
following 
 
Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. Identify critical performance variables (i.e. factors that 
indicate achievement of current strategy) 
 0.784 0.89 
2. Set targets for critical performance variables   0.799  
3. Monitor progress towards critical performance targets   0.839  
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4. Provide information to correct deviations from preset 
performance targets 
  0.758  
5. Review key areas of performance   0.756  
      
Interactive Control is based on the formative measurement model outlined by Bisbe et al. (2007). They identify five 
constitutive properties: (1) intensive use by top management, (2) intensive use by operating managers, (3) face-to-
face challenge and debate, (4) focus on strategic uncertainties, and (5) non-invasive, facilitating and inspirational 
involvement. These dimensions are each measured using a single indicator. The wording of indicators are made with 
reference to studies by Widener (2007), Henri (2006) and Bisbe and Otley (2004). 
   
   
 
To what extent does the top management team use 
budgets (performance measurement systems) for the 
following 
 
Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for top 
management activities 
 0.766 n/a 
2. Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for 
subordinate activities 
  0.832  
3. Enable continual challenge and debate of underlying 
data, assumptions and action plans with subordinates 
and peers 
  0.842  
4. Focus attention on strategic uncertainties (i.e. factors 
that may invalidate current strategy or provide 
opportunities for new strategic initiatives) 
  0.775  
5. Encourage and facilitate dialogue and information 
sharing with subordinates 
  0.832  
      
Tightness is based on Merchant’s (1985) conception of tight versus loose control. Merchant suggests that tighter 
control systems are present when there is: (1) more complete and specific targets, (2) more frequent and timely 
communication of targets, (3) closer and more frequent monitoring of results, and (4) a more transparent and stringent 
link between performance and rewards. These attributes are treated as the defining facets of a formative construct as 
they do not appear to share a common nomological net or necessarily covary. A single indicator is used to capture 
each attribute. Items are based on those used by Kober et al. (2007), Simons (1987) and Van der Stede (2001). 
   
   
The following questions relate to pre-established 
targets set for subordinates of the top management 
team (e.g., senior managers that report directly to a 
member of the top management team).  These targets 
or goals may be financial (e.g., budget targets) or 
related to other performance dimensions. 
   
1. How flexible are subordinate performance targets once 
they have been set? (Reverse coded)  
 Very inflexible / Very 
flexible 
0.722 n/a 
2. How frequently are subordinates consulted about 
performance target achievement? (Reverse coded)  
 Very frequently (daily) / 
Monthly / Very infrequently 
(quarterly or longer) 
0.674  
3. To what extent are written explanations for variances 
from target performance levels required from 
subordinates? 
 Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
0.727  
4. To what extent are subordinate evaluations 
predominantly based on achievement of performance 
targets? 
 Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
0.761  
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Cost Control is assessed through three items derived from the reflective instrument of Simons (1987), Widener (2004) 
and Kober et al. (2007). 
   
   
1. Cost control systems monitor virtually all tasks in the 
SBU 
Strongly disagree / 
Strongly agree 
0.634 0.72 
2. SBU operations are controlled by analysing and 
reporting to top management variances between actual 
costs and standard or expected costs 
 Strongly disagree / 
Strongly agree 
0.871  
3. To what extent are cost centres used in your SBU?  Not used at all / Used 
occasionally / Used to a 
great extent 
0.555  
      
Measure Diversity is captured through six items each relating to a dimension of subordinate performance. The 
categories employed closely mirror those used in prior studies of measurement diversity (e.g., Henri, 2006; Ittner et al., 
2003; Scott and Tiessen, 1999). Respondents are also provided the option to include an additional, self-labelled 
dimension. 
   
   
 
To what extent are measures related to the following 
dimensions used to evaluate subordinate 
performance? 
 
N/A / Very low extent / 
Very high extent 
  
1. Customer (e.g., market share, satisfaction, retention)  0.609 n/a 
2. Employee (e.g., employee satisfaction, turnover, 
workforce capabilities and development) 
  0.689  
3. Operational Process (e.g., productivity, safety, cycle 
time) 
  0.649  
4. Innovation (e.g., R&D, new product/service success, 
development cycle time) 
  0.681  
5. Quality (e.g., product/service quality, defects, awards)   0.730  
6. Social Responsibility (e.g., environmental compliance, 
community impact, public image) 
  0.751  
7. Other Dimension (please elaborate)     
            
      
Compensation     
      
Performance Based Compensation is measured using a pre-existing instrument from Chalos and O’Connor (2004). 
The three item reflective model is a modified version of the construct used by Shields and Young (1993). 
   
   
Please indicate the extent to which… Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. The financial rewards of subordinates increase as 
actual performance increasingly exceeds targets 
  0.762 0.73 
2. Subordinates whose performance relative to targets is 
among the top 25% are given larger financial rewards 
than those given to managers among the bottom 25% 
  0.688  
3. Compensation contracts clearly specify how 
compensation is related to subordinate performance 
relative to performance targets 
  0.662  
      
Subjective / Objective Based Compensation is measured through a single indicator based on the item used by Simons 
(1987). Indicator end-points represent an entirely subjective or entirely objective determination of compensation 
respectively. 
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1. What is the usual basis for determining performance-
based or bonus compensation for subordinates? 
 Determined Subjectively 
(based on top 
management assessment) 
/ Intermediate / Determined 
Objectively 
(based on pre-determined 
formulas or targets) 
n/a n/a 
      
Short / Long Term Based Compensation is assessed with a single item. End-points of the indicator represent short or 
long term orientations in determining compensation. Short term is defined as one year or less and long term as three 
years or more (Galbraith and Merrill, 1991). 
   
   
1. Indicate the emphasis on short-term performance (one 
year or less) relative to long-term performance (three 
years or more) for subordinate compensation. 
Based on short term 
performance / Equal 
emphasis / Based on long 
term performance 
n/a n/a 
            
      
Structure     
      
Decentralization is measured through five items representing key decision areas of firm top management. These items 
are based on the scales by Khandwalla (1973) and Gordon and Narayanan (1984), and have been employed 
extensively in the literature (e.g., Abernethy et al., 2004). As managers may selectively choose the decisions rights to 
allocate to subordinates (Khandwalla, 1973) the attributes may not empirically covary, indicating a formative 
measurement model. 
      
 Indicate the emphasis on short-term performance (one 
year or less) relative to long-term performance (three 
years or more) for subordinate compensation. 
 Top management has all 
influence / About the same 
/ Subordinates have all 
influence 
  
1. Development of new products or services   0.701 n/a 
2. The hiring and firing of managerial personnel   0.648  
3. Selection of large investments   0.682  
4. Resource allocations   0.703  
5. Pricing decisions   0.739  
      
Communication is measured using four items with end-points reflecting a continuum of mechanistic to organic 
processes (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Two of the items are from Covin et al. (2001) and Leifer and Huber (1977), while 
the remaining are modifications of items used by Chenhall and Morris (1995) and Covin et al. (2001). 
      
1. Indicate how control information is typically 
communicated in your SBU 
 Through highly structured, 
formal channels of 
communication / Through 
very open, informal 
channels of communication 
0.589 0.75 
2. Indicate the accessibility of operational information in 
your SBU 
 Highly restrictive access to 
important operational 
information / Free flow of 
important operational 
information throughout the 
SBU 
0.695  
3. Indicate the content of work-related communication 
between top management and subordinates 
 Top management 
decisions and mandates, 
instructional, direction 
giving / Information and 





4. In general, the operating management philosophy in 
my SBU favours 
 Emphasis on giving the 
most say in decision 
making to formal line 
managers / Emphasis on 
giving the most say to the 
expert in a given situation 
even if this means 
bypassing formal line 
authority 
0.609  
      
Integrative Liaison Devices is captured through a formative four item index of the main lateral coordination 
mechanisms outlined by Galbraith (1973). The construct is comparable to those used in prior studies (Abernethy and 
Lillis, 1995). 
      
 To what extent are the activities between sub-units in 
your SBU coordinated through… 
 N/A / Very low extent / 
Very high extent 
  
1. Liaison personnel whose specific job is to coordinate 
the efforts of several sub-units 
  0.694 n/a 
2. Temporary task forces or committees set up to 
facilitate collaboration on specific projects 
  0.629  
3. Permanent cross-functional teams   0.761  
4. Matrix structures entailing multiple lines of authority, 
multiple responsibility assignments and overlapping 
team membership 
  0.680  
      
Hierarchy is measured by the number of hierarchical levels in the firm divided by the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees (Scott and Tiessen, 1999). 
      
1. The number of hierarchical levels divided by the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees 
  n/a n/a 
            
      
Policies and Procedures     
      
Autonomy is captured reflectively using two items based on those employed by Kober et al. (2007) and Ito and 
Peterson (1986). 
      
 To what extent…  Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. Do subordinates conduct non-routine activities 
independent of top management involvement? 
  0.763 0.736 
2. Do subordinates have the freedom to create their own 
methods of getting work done if no standard 
procedures exist? 
  0.763  
      
Boundary Systems is based on the conceptualization of Simons (1995). Simons argues that boundary systems contain 
four dimensions: (1) they define appropriate conduct, (2) are used to limit search and experimentation, (3) are actively 
communicated by top management, and (4) sanctions are applied to subordinates engaging in unauthorized activities 
irrespective of the outcome. As these attributes are defining facets and do not necessarily covary the construct is 
considered formative. A single item is used to capture each attribute. Items are based on those developed by Widener 
(2007) and the descriptions of Simons (1995). 
      





1. Are codes of conduct or similar statements relied upon 
to define appropriate behaviour? 
  0.655 n/a 
2. Are there policies or guidelines that stipulate specific 
areas for, or limits on, opportunity search and 
experimentation? 
  0.724  
3. Does top management actively communicate risks and 
activities to be avoided by subordinates? 
  0.784  
4. Are sanctions or punishments applied to subordinates 
who engage in risks and activities outside 
organisational policy, irrespective of the outcome? 
  0.746  
      
Standardization is based on a three item reflective measurement model. One item relates to the use of policies and 
procedures to guide the day to day work activities of subordinates (Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Gerdin, 2005; Simons, 
1987) and two items capture the use of standardized methods of lateral coordination (Ruekert and Walker, 1987). 
      
 To what extent…     
1. Are the work activities of subordinates determined by 
standardised procedures or processes? 
 Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
0.542 0.67 
 To what extent are the activities between sub-units in 
your SBU coordinated through… 
    
2. Pre-planning of activities between sub-units  N/A / Very low extent / 
Very high extent 
0.511  
3. Standardised rules, programs or procedures that are 
formally or informally understood between sub-units 
  0.871  
      
Pre-Action Reviews is measured using two items. Items relate to two key dimensions outlined by Merchant and Van 
der Stede (2012) that differentiate between tight and loose application of pre-action reviews, and hence the construct 
is modeled formatively. One item relates to the frequency of conducting reviews, and the other measures the detail 
required from subordinates during the review process. 
      
1. To what extent are formal pre-action reviews used to 
assess projects undertaken by subordinates? 
 Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
0.856 n/a 
2. How detailed are the reports or plans required from 
subordinates before initiating specific projects? 
 Little detail / Highly detailed 0.856  
            
      
Socio-Ideological     
      
Selection is a reflective construct measured through two indicators. Items are based on those in Snell (1992) and 
Widener (2004). 
      
1. How extensive is the recruitment and selection process 
(e.g., search for candidates, use of tests, multiple 
interviews) for a managerial position? 
 Not very extensive / Very 
extensive 
0.738 0.71 
2. How much importance is placed on selecting managers 
who have attitudes and values aligned to the SBU, not 
just on technical competence? 
 Very little / A great deal 0.738  
      
Socialization is developed as a formative construct. Items represent the formal methods of organizational socialization 
identified in the literature, being mentoring, social functions and training (Chatman, 1991; Harrison and Carroll, 1991). 
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 To what extent are…  Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. training and development processes used to reinforce 
SBU objectives, expectations and norms? 
  0.788 n/a 
2. Social events and functions used to develop and 
maintain commitment to the SBU? 
  0.765  
3. Mentoring, orientation and induction programs used to 
acclimatise new managers to acceptable behaviours, 
routines and norms? 
  0.850  
      
Belief Systems is based on the conceptualization of Simons (1995). Simons describes belief systems as containing 
four defining attributes: (1) they codify the values of the firm, (2) are actively communicated, (3) are used to create 
commitment to firm objectives, (4) they inspire and guide the search for new opportunities. As these attributes define 
the construct indicators are considered formative. Single items, based on those used by Widener (2007) and the 
descriptions of Simons (1995), are used to capture each dimension. 
      
 To what extent…  Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
  
1. Are the values, purpose and direction of the SBU 
codified in formal documents? (e.g., mission/value 
statements, credos, statements of purpose?) 
  0.825 n/a 
2. Does top management actively communicate core 
values to subordinates? 
  0.864  
3. Are formal statements of values used to create 
commitment to the long-term vision of top 
management? 
  0.930  
4. Are formal statements of values used to motivate and 
guide subordinates in searching for new opportunities? 
  0.904  
      
Social Control is measured through a four item reflective scale. Two items, relating to the extent of shared norms and 
expectations, and the extent of commitment to firm objectives and values, are adaptations from the instrument used in 
Kober et al. (2007). The remaining two items are formulated with reference to literature on organizational culture and 
social control (Ouchi, 1979; Schein, 2004). 
      
 To what extent…     
1. Is there a sense of shared values, beliefs and 
expectations among employees? 
 Very low extent / Very high 
extent 
0.832 0.87 
2. Is there a consensus among employees on SBU 
objectives and direction? 
  0.808  
3. Are employees committed to the values and objectives 
outlined by top management? 
  0.886  
4. Does top management rely on the shared values and 
norms of employees to provide direction when faced 
with uncertainty? 
  0.676  
            
      
Technology is measured through six items from a previously validated construct by Snell (1992), which is originally 
based on Ouchi (1978) and Thompson (1967). Three items reflect the level of task programmability and three items 
relate to outcome measurability. 
      Please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
Strongly disagree / 
Strongly agree 
  









1. Standards of desirable performance for subordinates 
are well defined 
 0.580 0.75 
2. Results measures accurately depict how well 
subordinates have performed 
  0.806  
3. Top management has several sources of objective 
data available that indicate how well subordinates are 
performing 
  0.754  
      
Task Programmability     
1. The actions subordinates take to achieve results are 
visible to top management 
 
 0.714 0.78 
2. Effective and ineffective subordinates can be 
distinguished by observing the actions they take 
 
 0.668  
3. The relationship between the actions that subordinates 
take and the eventual outcomes are well known by top 
management 
 0.835  
            
      
Environment     
      
Unpredictability is measured through five items that represent the primary dimensions of an organization’s external 
environment. These dimensions are consistent with prior literature (Doty et al., 1993; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984). 
As unpredictability in one dimension does not necessarily imply the same in other dimensions the construct is 
formative. 
   
   
 
Over the past three years how predictable or 
unpredictable have important actions or changes in the 
external environment been? 
 
Very predictable / Very 
unpredictable 
  
1. Customers (e.g., Level of demand, customer 
requirements) 
 0.681 n/a 
2. Suppliers (e.g., Markets for key inputs, quality of 
resources) 
  0.652  
3. Competitors (e.g., Competitors entering or leaving, 
tactics/strategies) 
  0.700  
4. Technological (e.g., R&D advances, process 
innovations) 
  0.475  
5. Economic / Regulatory   0.681  
      
Turbulence is measured through five items. Items relate to the same dimensions used to assess unpredictability, with 
similar items used previously in the literature (Doty et al., 1993). As significant changes in one dimension do not 
necessarily imply turbulence in others the construct is formative. 
   
   
 
Over the past three years how many changes have 
occurred that have had a material impact on the nature 
of your business? 
 
Very few changes / Very 
many changes 
  
1. Customers (e.g., Level of demand, customer 
requirements) 
 0.664 n/a 
2. Suppliers (e.g., Markets for key inputs, quality of 
resources) 
  0.579  
3. Competitors (e.g., Competitors entering or leaving, 
tactics/strategies) 
  0.734  
4. Technological (e.g., R&D advances, process 
innovations) 
  0.623  
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5. Economic / Regulatory   0.625  
      
Complexity is assessed using two items. Items capture the diversity of customer requirements and competitor 
strategies. These dimensions are considered to be the primary sources of environmental complexity (Miller and 
Friesen, 1983). The items are formative as complexity in one dimension need not correlate with complexity in the 
other. 
   
   
1. How diverse in nature are the product/service 
requirements of your customers to each other? 
Very similar / Very diverse 0.861 n/a 
2. How diverse are the strategies and tactics of your key 
competitors to each other? 
  0.861  
      
Hostility is captured through three items that relate to the dimensions of competition, resources and strategic 
opportunities. Items are developed based on the discussion of munificence by Castrogiovanni (1991) and the 
instruments of Tan and Litschert (1994) and Miller and Freisen (1983). The construct is measured formatively as 
dimensions do not necessarily covary. 
   
   
1. How intense is the competition for your main 
products/services? 
Very low intensity / Very 
high intensity 
0.662 n/a 
2. How difficult is it to obtain the necessary inputs for your 
business? 
 Very low difficulty / Very 
high difficulty 
0.751  
3. How many strategic opportunities are currently 
available to your business? 
 Very few / Very many 0.411  
            
      
Strategy is elicited through eleven items that reflect a wide range of generic strategic orientations. Items are obtained 
from the instruments of Chenhall (2005), Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), and Ittner et al. (2003), with minor 
modifications to reflect the industry diversity of firms in the sample. 
      
 Indicate the emphasis your SBU places on the 
following strategic priorities relative to your competitors 
 Very low emphasis / Very 
high emphasis 
  
      
Low Cost     
1. Low cost products / services   0.729 0.78 
2. Low price   0.888  
      
Innovation     
1. Being first to market with new products / services 
 
 0.657 0.73 
2. Extensive range of products / services 
 
 0.509  
3. Rapid volume or product / service mix changes 
 
 0.653  
4. Experimenting with new products / services 
 
 0.773  
  
 
   
Customer Focus    
1. Providing high quality products / services 
 
 0.518 0.77 
2. Accurately meeting delivery agreements 
 
 0.635  
3. Providing effective after-sales services and support  0.584  
4. Providing fast delivery of products/services   0.669  
5. Superior customer services   0.814  
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Description of ideal types (comparable types shown in the same row) 
Mintzberg (1979, 1989) Burns and Stalker (1961) 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975); 
Merchant (1981) 
Ouchi (1977, 1979); Eisenhardt 
(1985); Snell (1992) 
Speklé (2001) Vosselman (2002) 
Machine bureaucracy Mechanistic Administrative Output Results-oriented bureaucracy Weakly bureaucratic 
Structure: Highly formalized, 
standardized rules and 
procedures, limited 
decentralization, hierarchical 
channels of communication, 
extensive planning. 
Context: Old, large firms; 








formal and vertical patterns of 
communication. 
Context: Stable, predictable 
environments. 
Structure: Clearly defined 
hierarchical authority, 
decentralized decision making, 
vertical communication, highly 
formalized, standardized rules 
and procedures, detailed 
planning and budgeting 
systems. 
Context: Large, diverse firms; 
complex technology. 
Structure: Hierarchical authority, 
limited decentralization, 
predetermined targets, 
performance dependent rewards. 
Context: High outcome 
measurability 
Structure: Hierarchical authority 
structure, predetermined targets, 
tight individual accountability, 
performance based rewards. 




predetermined targets based 
on aggregate financial 
information, vertical 
information flows. 
Context: Low uncertainty. 
Behaviour Action-oriented bureaucracy Strongly bureaucratic 
Structure: Centralized authority, 
standardized rules and 
procedures, direct monitoring and 
supervision, evaluation based on 
behavioural conformance. 
Context: High task 
programmability. 
Structure: Hierarchical authority 
structure, standardized 
behaviours, codified rules and 
procedures, detailed monitoring 
and supervision. 
Context: Low uncertainty; high 
task programmability. 
Structure: Hierarchical 
authority structure, codified 
rules and procedures, pre-
action reviews, action 
accountability, vertical 
information flows. 
Context: Low uncertainty. 




authority, coordination through 
mutual adjustment, informal 
and organic communication, 
extensive liaison devices. 
Context: Young, smaller firms; 
complex and dynamic 
environments; sophisticated 
technology. 
Structure: Mutual adjustment, 
decentralized authority, little 
formalization, shared 
accountability, fluid ad-hoc 
structure, lateral and 
emergent patterns of 
communication. 
Context: Dynamic, uncertain 
environments. 
   Structure: Mutual adjustment, little 
formal control, long-term 
performance evaluation based on 
emergent standards, extensive 
information sharing through open 
communication channels. 
Context: High uncertainty. 
  
Simple  Interpersonal    
Structure: Centralized 
authority, coordination through 
direct supervision, little 
formalization. 
Context: Young, small firms; 
simple, dynamic and 
potentially hostile environment; 
non-sophisticated, non-routine 
technology. 
  Structure: Centralized 
authority,  coordination 
through direct personal 
supervision, little formalization, 
rudimentary budgeting 
systems. 
Context: Small firms; simple 
technology. 
      
Missionary   Input/Clan   
Structure: Emphasis on 
ideological control through 
selection, socialization, and 
indoctrination, highly informal 
and loose structures, collective 
authority. 
Context: Small firms. 
    Structure: Emphasis on 
internalization of shared values 
and beliefs through selection, 
socialization and peer monitoring, 
highly informal and implicit 
structure, minimal formal control. 
Context: Low outcome 
measurability; low task 
programmability. 






Definitions of management control constructs 
Construct Definition 
  Strategic Planning 
Mode Mode of developing the long-term ends and means of the firm - ad-hoc, 
adaptive and emergent, to formalized, deterministic and deliberate (Brews and 
Hunt, 1999; Mintzberg, 1994) 
Participation Involvement of subordinates in strategic planning processes (Ketokivi and 
Castaner, 2004; Shields and Young, 1993) 
Measurement  
Diagnostic Monitoring activity through deviations from preset standards of performance 
(Simons, 1995) 
Interactive Regular involvement in subordinate activities by management to encourage 
debate, creative behaviors and address strategic uncertainties (Bisbe et al., 
2007; Simons, 1995) 
Tightness Individual accountability for meeting pre-established performance targets 
(Merchant, 1985b, 1998; Van der Stede, 2001) 
Cost Control Financial performance measures of cost efficiency and effectiveness (Kober et 
al., 2007; Simons, 1987) 
Measure Diversity Broad scope and non-financial performance measures (Henri, 2006; Ittner et 
al., 2003) 
Compensation  
Performance Pay Performance-contingent rewards and incentives (Fisher, 1995; Shields and 
Young, 1993) 
Subjective / Objective Method of determining individual compensation – subjective to objective 
(Fisher, 1995; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985) 
Short / Long Term Time horizon used for individual compensation – short to long term (Fisher, 
1995; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985) 
Structure  
Decentralization Locus of authority - centralized to decentralized (Abernethy et al.,2004; Gordon 
and Narayanan, 1984) 
Hierarchy Vertical differentiation of firm structure - flat to tall (Scott and Tiessen, 1999) 
Communication Nature, direction and content of communication patterns - mechanistic to 
organic (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chenhall and Morris, 1995) 
Integrative Liaison Devices Horizontal structural arrangements overlaying traditional functional structures 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Galbraith, 1973) 
Policies and Procedures  
Autonomy Work activities conducted in the absence of direct observation or involvement 
by management (Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Kober et al., 2007) 
Boundary Systems Statements defining acceptable or unacceptable domains of activity (Simons, 
1995) 
Standardization Rules and procedures specifying the means of conducting work activities (Daft 
and Macintosh, 1984) 
Pre-action Reviews Processes of scrutinization and authorization prior to activity performance 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012; Speklé, 2001) 
Socio-Ideological  
Selection Search, evaluation and recruitment of employees according to a set of criteria, 
such as value alignment (Chatman, 1991; Harrison and Carrol, 1991) 
Socialization Processes whereby individuals come to appreciate prevailing norms and beliefs 
in the firm (Chatman, 1991; Harrison and Carrol, 1991) 
Belief Systems Statements communicating the basic values and premises for action of the firm 
(Schein, 2004; Simons, 1995) 
Social Control Reliance on shared values, norms and beliefs to direct work activities (Ouchi, 
1979; Schein, 2004) 








Definitions of context constructs 
Construct Definition 
  Technology 
Outcome Measurability Extent to which outcomes of subordinate activity can be validly and reliably 
captured in quantitative standards of performance (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 
1977) 
Task Programmability Extent to which subordinate actions required to achieve an objective are 
known and visible to top management (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1977) 
Environment  
Unpredictability Inability to anticipate variations among elements of the environment and 
assess the effect of material changes on the organization (Child, 1972; Dess 
and Beard, 1984; Miller and Friesen, 1983) 
Turbulence Rate of change and instability in the environment (Dess and Beard, 1984; 
Mintzberg, 1979) 
Complexity Range and diversity of environmental factors relevant to firm operations 
(Child, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984) 
Hostility Degree of threat from competitors for market demand, necessary resources 
and opportunities for growth (Child, 1972; Khandwalla, 1973; Miller and 
Friesen, 1983) 
Strategy  
Low Cost Emphasis on cost and efficiency of operations and competition through low 
price (Chenhall, 2005; Porter, 1980) 
Innovation Emphasis on differentiation through new product development (Ittner et al., 
2003; Porter, 1980) 
Customer Focus Emphasis on differentiation through customization and flexible response to 
customer demands (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Porter, 1980) 








Table 4  
Demographic data  
  
n 
  Panel A: Industry classification 
 




Transportation, utilities 31 
Wholesale 22 
Retail 20 
Finance, insurance, real estate 41 
Services 78 
Other 3 
  Total sample 400 
  Panel B: Size of organizations 
 





  Total sample 400 
    








  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Strategic Planning 
      
Mode (Informal / Formal) 3.64 1.27 1.00 7.00 0.30 -0.60 
Participation 3.41 1.51 1.00 7.00 0.32 -0.89 
Measurement 
      Diagnostic 5.51 0.83 1.90 7.00 -0.72 0.80
Interactive 4.78 1.03 1.40 7.00 -0.48 0.05 
Tightness 4.32 0.98 2.00 6.75 -0.16 -0.59 
Cost Focus 5.05 1.10 1.67 7.00 -0.61 -0.07 
Measure Diversity 4.26 1.06 0.00 7.00 -0.53 0.63 
Compensation 
      Performance Pay 4.56 1.42 1.00 7.00 -0.47 -0.38
Subjective / Objective 4.63 1.75 1.00 7.00 -0.52 -0.81 
Short / Long Term 2.44 1.34 1.00 7.00 0.80 -0.08 
Structure 
      Decentralization 2.48 0.80 1.00 5.80 0.45 0.23
Hierarchy (Flat / Tall)a 3.87 1.81 1.08 7.00 0.17 0.17 
Communication (Mech. / Org.) 4.10 0.96 1.00 6.75 -0.14 -0.26 
Integrative Liaison Devices 3.29 1.22 0.00 6.50 -0.14 -0.39 
Policies and Procedures 
      Autonomy 4.98 1.05 1.50 7.00 -0.68 0.08
Boundary Systems 4.68 1.03 1.50 7.00 -0.35 -0.03 
Standardization 4.43 0.95 1.33 6.33 -0.62 -0.08 
Pre-Action Reviews 4.37 1.19 1.00 7.00 -0.42 -0.32 
Socio-Ideological 
      Selection 5.44 1.04 1.50 7.00 -0.92 1.04
Socialization 4.08 1.19 1.00 7.00 -0.27 -0.37 
Belief Systems 4.53 1.36 1.00 7.00 -0.32 -0.55 
Social Control 4.57 1.03 1.50 7.00 -0.30 -0.28 
       
       Technology 
      
Outcome Measurability 4.85 0.96 2.00 7.00 -0.54 -0.10 
Task Programmability 4.72 1.04 1.33 7.00 -0.57 0.11 
Environment 
      
Unpredictability 3.61 0.91 1.00 6.00 -0.06 -0.28 
Turbulence 3.72 0.99 1.40 6.40 0.13 -0.34 
Complexity 3.45 1.29 1.00 7.00 0.31 -0.43 
Hostility 4.41 0.83 1.67 7.00 -0.04 0.33 
Strategy 
      
Low Cost 3.82 1.45 1.00 7.00 0.19 -0.76 
Innovation 4.10 1.10 1.00 7.00 -0.06 -0.28 
Customer Focus 5.63 0.85 2.80 7.00 -0.63 0.10 
Sizeb 5.82 0.91 4.61 8.70 0.92 0.36 
Listed 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.19 -1.97 
Agec 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.75 -1.44 
       
       a For ease of comparison the hierarchy variable has been transformed using the softmax scaling procedure to a 
range of 1–7. The softmax procedure is a linear transformation of a variable for values within a specified span 
of standard deviations. Outlier values are truncated, so the distribution reaches maximum and minimum values 
asymptotically. This is appropriate for the hierarchy variable, which has a small number of extreme outlier 
values.  A standard deviation response of 3 is chosen, meaning that 99.7 percent of cases are transformed 
linearly, preserving the inherent meaning of the variable (Pyle, 1995). 
b Size is the natural logarithm of the number of employees. 








Pearson bivariate correlations a 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Strategic Planning (1) 
                Planning Participation (2) -0.36 
               Diagnostic (3) -0.25 0.10 
              Interactive (4) -0.38 0.26 0.65 
             Tightness (5) -0.23 0.09 0.41 0.22 
            Cost Focus (6) -0.18 0.03 0.26 0.28 0.18 
           Measure Diversity (7) -0.37 0.26 0.40 0.52 0.13 0.17 
          Performance Pay (8) -0.26 0.22 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.15 0.20 
         Objective Pay (9) -0.16 0.09 0.33 0.23 0.45 0.10 0.11 0.50 
        Long Term Pay (10) -0.02 0.14 -0.07 0.13 -0.25 -0.05 0.16 -0.06 -0.21 
       Decentralization (11) -0.02 0.22 -0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.15 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.21 
      Hierarchy (12) -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.06 
     Communication (13) -0.02 0.22 0.04 0.18 -0.17 -0.10 0.17 -0.02 -0.01 0.33 0.29 -0.20 
    Liaison Devices (14) -0.21 0.28 0.23 0.39 0.10 0.14 0.37 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.18 -0.11 0.19 
   Autonomy (15) -0.14 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.21 -0.10 0.25 0.14 
  Boundary Systems (16) -0.26 0.13 0.27 0.36 0.12 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.43 0.11 
 Standardization (17) -0.28 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.15 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.42 -0.02 0.48 
Pre-Action Reviews (18) -0.40 0.30 0.28 0.43 0.19 0.20 0.43 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.46 
Selection (19) -0.29 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.10 0.11 0.34 0.26 0.14 0.00 0.08 -0.06 0.12 0.22 0.21 0.32 
Socialization (20) -0.40 0.27 0.31 0.47 0.09 0.12 0.48 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.13 -0.05 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.45 
Belief Systems (21) -0.40 0.29 0.23 0.37 0.10 0.19 0.44 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.11 0.38 0.11 0.47 
Social Control (22) -0.32 0.33 0.30 0.42 0.05 0.11 0.47 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.18 -0.03 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.34 
Task Programmability (23) -0.35 0.24 0.49 0.53 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.43 0.33 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.32 0.25 0.33 
Outcome Measurability (24) -0.23 0.22 0.39 0.47 0.15 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.02 0.07 -0.11 0.13 0.30 0.14 0.21 
Environmental Predictability (25) 0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.07 -0.15 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.06 0.07 
Environmental Turbulence (26) -0.08 0.14 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.06 -0.13 0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.13 
Environmental Complexity (27) -0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.18 0.17 -0.07 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.08 
Environmental Hostility (28) 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Strategy Low Cost (29) -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
Strategy Innovation (30) -0.07 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.09 -0.03 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.10 
Strategy Customer Focus (31) -0.18 0.08 0.29 0.35 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.21 
Size (32) -0.15 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.20 -0.22 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.03 
Listed (33) -0.14 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.18 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.10 0.05 0.11 
Age (34) -0.16 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.10 0.11 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.12 
                 
                 






Table 6 (cont.) 
Pearson bivariate correlations a 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) 
Pre-Action Reviews (18) 0.43 
                Selection (19) 0.35 0.35 
               Socialization (20) 0.42 0.45 0.47 
              Belief Systems (21) 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.64 
             Social Control (22) 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.60 0.59 
            Task Programmability (23) 0.37 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.30 0.38 
           Outcome Measurability (24) 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.40 0.31 0.41 0.62 
          Environmental Predictability (25) 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
         Environmental Turbulence (26) 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.52 
        Environmental Complexity (27) -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.27 0.28 
       Environmental Hostility (28) 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 
      Strategy Low Cost (29) 0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.13 
     Strategy Innovation (30) 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.16 -0.04 0.05 
    Strategy Customer Focus (31) 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.04 0.14 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.20 
   Size (32) 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.02 
  Listed (33) 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.08 
 Age (34) 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.04 
                  
                  








Results of K-Means clustering of management control constructsa,b 
 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 ANOVA MCP 
  Simple Results Action Devolved Hybrid F-Stat Sig. Games-Howell 
Strategic Planning 
      
    
Mode (Inf. / Formal) 3.45 4.00 4.57 4.07 5.25 37.22 0.000 5>3*>2,4*>1 
Participation 2.49 2.93 2.81 4.14 4.17 29.08 0.000 4,5>1,2,3 
Measurement        
 Diagnostic 4.70 5.71 5.26 5.28 6.08 54.22 0.000 5>2>3,4>1 
Interactive 3.67 4.51 4.63 5.01 5.61 77.37 0.000 5>4*>2,3*>1 
Tightness 3.59 4.94 4.12 3.72 4.72 43.82 0.000 2,5>3*>1,4* 
Cost Control 4.56 5.00 5.16 4.79 5.47 10.11 0.000 5>1,2,4; 3>1 
Measure Diversity 3.23 3.85 4.44 4.54 4.97 54.85 0.000 5>3,4>2>1 
Compensation        
 Performance Pay 3.21 5.31 3.40 4.45 5.39 72.33 0.000 2,5>4>1,3 
Subjective / Objective 3.24 5.76 3.33 3.97 5.55 62.28 0.000 2,5>4*>1*; 2,5>3 
Short / Long Term 2.19 1.86 2.21 4.00 2.27 37.75 0.000 4>1,2,3,5; 5*>2* 
Structure        
 Decentralization 2.11 2.49 2.11 3.12 2.50 19.92 0.000 4>2,5>1,3 
Hierarchy (Flat/Tall) 4.27 4.24 4.29 2.86 3.73 8.31 0.000 1,2,3,5>4 
Communication (Mech./Org.) 3.91 3.73 3.71 4.92 4.22 21.89 0.000 4>5>2,3; 4>1 
Integrative Liaison Devices 2.11 2.98 3.44 3.80 3.89 40.03 0.000 3*,4,5>2*>1 
Policies and Procedures        
 Autonomy 4.43 4.94 4.50 5.52 5.25 16.29 0.000 4>2*>1,3*; 5>1,3 
Boundary Systems 3.57 4.47 5.19 4.88 5.18 48.90 0.000 3,4,5>2>1 
Standardization 3.35 4.26 5.17 4.35 4.93 69.05 0.000 3,5>2,4>1 
Pre-Action Reviews 3.08 4.03 4.65 4.66 5.14 59.77 0.000 5>3,4>2>1 
Socio-Ideological        
 Selection 4.72 5.11 5.68 5.27 6.09 31.12 0.000 5>3*>1,2,4* 
Socialization 2.81 3.49 4.49 4.35 4.96 82.49 0.000 5>3,4>2>1 
Belief Systems 3.08 3.87 4.81 4.90 5.58 86.03 0.000 5>3,4>2>1 
Social Control 3.59 4.04 4.62 4.82 5.38 73.24 0.000 5>3,4>2>1 
         
         
Cluster Membership 74 88 52 65 121    
                  
 
a Pairs indicated by an asterisk (*) are significant at the 0.10 level. All others are significant at the 0.05 level or better. 






Comparison of context constructs across clustersa,b 
 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 ANOVA MCP 
  Simple Results Action Devolved Hybrid F-Stat Sig. Games-Howell 
Technology       
    
Outcome Measurability 3.60 4.78 4.68 4.58 5.45 57.36 0.000 5>2,3,4>1 
Task Programmability 4.05 4.73 4.79 4.81 5.46 34.00 0.000 5>2,3,4>1 
Environment         
Unpredictability 3.64 3.43 3.82 3.82 3.52 2.80 0.026 3*,4>2* 
Turbulence 3.56 3.47 3.92 3.80 3.88 3.34 0.010 3*,5>2* 
Complexity 3.37 3.28 3.65 3.72 3.40 1.48 0.206 - 
Hostility 4.38 4.35 4.74 4.34 4.35 2.54 0.039 3*>2*,4*,5* 
Strategy         
Low Cost 3.78 3.84 3.79 3.82 3.83 0.03 0.999 - 
Innovation 3.78 4.08 3.73 4.33 4.36 5.66 0.000 4,5>1,3 
Customer Focus 5.22 5.40 5.69 5.63 6.02 13.95 0.000 5>3,4*>1*; 5>2 
Other         
Size (Employees) 394 548 372 575 752 3.25 0.012 5>1,3 
Listed c 0.42 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.64 11.19 0.025 5>1 
Age c 0.58 0.70 0.69 0.57 0.74 9.20 0.056 - 
                  
 
a Pairs indicated by an asterisk (*) are significant at the 0.10 level. All others are significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
b Underlined figures denote the lowest value on each variable. Bold numbers denote the highest value on each variable. 







Results of predictive discriminant analysisa 
  
Group 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Count 
1 49 9 6 8 2 74 
2 15 38 14 8 13 88 
3 6 5 26 10 5 52 
4 8 13 13 19 12 65 
5 2 8 11 16 84 121 
% 
1 66.2 12.2 8.1 10.8 2.7 100 
2 17.0 43.2 15.9 9.1 14.8 100 
3 11.5 9.6 50.0 19.2 9.6 100 
4 12.3 20.0 20.0 29.2 18.5 100 
5 1.7 6.6 9.1 13.2 69.4 100 
a Correctly classified cases are shown along the diagonal from top-left to bottom-right. 
 
